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32 MOURA v. STATE BAR. [18 C. (2d) 
THE COURT.-The recommendation of The State Bar 
that the petitioner be disbarred is challenged by him in this 
proceeding to review its action. He contends that the pen-
alty imposed upon him is too severe, considering the offense 
which he committed. 
There is no dispute concerning the facts. The petitioner 
raised the check of a client from $6 to $6,000, cashed it and 
appropriated the money. He later pleaded guilty ~o a·charge 
of forgery. Upon a showing that he had made full restitu-
tion of ,the' money, the court suspended the imposition of 
sentence and placed him on probation for a period of five 
years upon condition, among others, that he refrain from the 
practice of law during that time. 
Followin.g' the disposition of the criminal charge, The State 
-Bar instituted disciplinary proceedings against him. Upon 
hearing' the evidence, a local administrative committee 
adopted findings, which were approved by the Board of Gov-
ernors, that he should be disbarred. The petitioner contends 
that because he was granted probation in the criminal case, 
the penalty in the disciplinary proceeding should be only 
a suspension of. his license to practice law for the period of 
probation. The fact that he was placed on probation, says 
the petitioner, "should be entitled to great weight and con-
trolling importance" .. 
[1] Ordinarily, the findings of a local administrative com-
mittee which have been. approved by the Board of Governors 
will be followed by this court, although it is not boun~. 
thereby. [2] In the present case the facts fully justify thi} 
recommendation which has been made. A member of thtl, 
bar who appropriated $6,000 of his client's money by (L'J"tg'. 
ing a ~heck certainly does not have the" good moral dJ(a.rv 
acter" which is required of an attorney at law by the &t.lJf;uteL 
of this state (Bus. & Prof. Code, sec. 6062), and he la(~k'iJ all 
',appreciation:of the principles of common honesty.NJ.ore-
over, his past conduct should be considered in cOlliLl'eetion 
with the present charges against him. (Kennedy v .. State 
Bar, 13.oa1. (2d) 236 [88 Pac. (2d) 920].) The fs)et that 
in 1937, disciplinary proceedings were instituted agairJ.!3t the 
petitio:ner and he was privately reproved indicates that he 
. has not"fp.lfill,~d his professional obligations in the }J<uA;" The 
penalty imposed upon an attorney at law for p;(.fdu;r;ional 
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misconduct is not only to punish the individual but to pro-
tect the public, the legal profession and the court (Marsh v. 
State Bar, 2 Cal. (2d) 75 [39 Pac. (2d) 403]), and the peti-
tioner's abuse of his right to practice an honorable profes-
sion necessitates his removal from it. 
lt is ordered that the petitioner be disbarred and that his 
name be stricken from the roll of attorneys at law of this 
state. 
PetitIoner's application for a rehearing was denied May 26, 
1941. 
[L. A. No. 16558. In Bank.-April 29, 1941.] 
IMPERIAL ICE COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant, v. 
WAYNE ROSSlER et aI., Respondents. 
[1] Interference-With Contract Relations-lndticing Breach by 
Unlawful Means.-An action will lie for inducing· a breach of 
contract by a resort to means in themselves unlawful, such as 
libel, slander, fraud, physical violence, or threats of such ac-
tion. 
[2] ld.-With Contract Relations-Competition as Justification. 
A person is not justified in inducing a breach of contract 
simply because he is in competition with one of the parties 
to the contract, and seeks to further' his own economic ad-
vantage at the expense of the other. 
[3] ld.-With Contract Relations-Right of Action.-An action 
will lie for unjustifiably inducing a breach of contract. (Con-
trary statements in Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578, 33 Pac. 492, 
21 L. R. A. 233, disapproved.) 
[4] ld.-With Contract Relations--Complaint.-A cause of action 
is stated in a complaint for· injunctive relief which alleges 
that defendants intentionally and actively induced a party to' 
violate his contract with the plaintiff so that they could sell 
ice to him, that the contract gave the plaintiff the right to 
sell ice in the stated territory free from competition of the 
contracting party, that the defendants, by virtue of their in-
1. Liability for procuring breach of contract, note, 84 A. L. R. 
43. See, also, 14 Cal. Jur. 695; 30 Am. Jur. 70. 
McK .. Dig. References: 1-4. Interference, § L 
1.8 C. (2d)-2 . 
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terest in the sale of ice in such territory, were in effect com-
peting with the plaintiff, and that by inducing the violation 
of the contract they sought to further their own economic 
advantage at plaintiff's expense. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Fred Miller, Judge pro tem. Reversed. 
Action to enjoin violation by one defendant of a contract 
not to engage in business in competition with a purchaser, 
and to restrain other defendants from inducing a breach of the 
contract. Judgment for the latter on sustaining a demurrer 
to the complaint without leave to amend, reversed. 
Earl E. Moss and Everett A. Hart for Appellant. 
M. Tellefson for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-The California Consumers Company pur-
chased from S. L. Coker an ice distributing business, inclu-
sive of good will, located in territory comprising the city of 
Santa Monica and the former city of Sawtelle.· In the pur-
chase agreement Coker contracted as follows: "I do further 
agree in consideration of said purchase and in connection 
therewith, that I will not engage in the business of selling 
and or distributing ice, either directly or indirectly, in the 
above described territory so long as the purchasers, or anyone 
deriving title to the good will of said business from said pur-
chasers, shall be engaged in a like business therein." Plain-
tiff, the Imperial Ice Company, acquired from the successor 
in interest of the California Consumers Company full title to 
this ice distributing business, including the right to enforce 
the covenant not to compete. Coker subsequently began sell-
ing in the same territory, in violation of the contract, ice sup-
plied to him by a company owned by W. Rossier, J. A. Mathe-
son, and Fred Matheson. Plaintiff thereupon brought this 
action· in the superior court for an· injunction to restrain 
Coker from violating the contract and to restrain Rossier and 
the Mathesons from inducing Coker to violate the contract. 
The complaint alleges that Rossier and the Mathesons in-
duced Coker to violate his contract so that they might sell 
ice to him at a profit. The trial court sustained without leave 
to amend a demurrer· to the complaint of the defendants 
April, 1941.] IMPERIAL ICE CO. v. ROSSlER. 
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Rossier and Mathesons and gave judgment for those defend-
ants. Plaintiff has appealed from the judgment on. the sole 
ground that the complaint stated a cause of action against 
the defendants Rossfer and the Mathesons for inducing the 
breach of contract. 
The question thus presented to this court is under what 
circumstan'ces mayan action be maintained against a defend-
ant who has induced a third party to violate a contract with 
the plaintiff. 
[1] It is universally recognized that an action will lie for 
inducing breach of contract by a resort to means in them-
selves unlawful such as libel, slander, fraud, physical vio-
lence, or threats of such action. (See cases cited in 24 Cal. 
L. Rev. 208; 84 A. L. R. 67.) Most jurisdictions also hold 
that an action will lie for inducing a breach of contract by 
the use of moral, social, or economic pressures, in themselves 
lawful, unless there is sufficient justification for such induce-
ment. (See cases cited in 84 A. L. R. 55; 24 Cal. L. Rev. 
208, 209; see Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 Harv. 
L. Rev. 663, 671; Carpenter, Interference With Contractual 
Relations, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 728, 732; Rest., Torts, gec. 766.) 
Such justification exists when a person induces a breach 
of contract to protect an interest that has greater social 
value than insuring the stability of the contract. (Rest., 
Torts, sec. 767.) Thus, a person is justified in inducing the 
breach of a contract the enforcement of which would be in-
jurious to health, safety, or good morals. (Brimelow v. Oas-
son, (1924) 1 Ch. 302; Legris v. Marcotte, 129 Ill. App. 67; 
Rest., Torts, sec. 767 (d).) The interest of labor in im_] 
proving working co. nditions is of sufficient social importance .. 
to justify peaceful labor tactics otherwise lawful, though 
they have the effect of inducing breaches of contracts· be-
tween employer and employee or employer and customer. 
(Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70 [103 Pac. 324]; 
Parkinson 00. v. Butlding Trades Oouncil, 154 Cal. 581 [98 
Pac. 1027, 16 Ann. Cas. 1165, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 550]; Mc-
Kay Y. Retail Automob~1e Salesmen's Local Union No. 1067, 
16 Cal. (2d)· 311 [106 Pac. (2d) 373] ; Kemp Y. Division No .. 
241, 255 Ill. 213 [99 N. E. 389, Ann. Cas: 1913D, 347] ; 
Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572 [78 N. E. 753, 116 Am. St. 
Rep. 272, 7 Ann. Cas. 638, 6 L. R.A. (N. S.) 1067]; Grant 
Oonst. Oo.v. St. Paul BuilcUng Trades Oouncil, 136 Minn. 
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167 [161 N. W. 520, 1055] ; National Protective Assn. v. Cum" 
ming, 170 N. Y. 315 [63 N. E. 369, 88 Am. St. Rep. 648, 58 
L. R. A. 135] ; Roddy v. United Mine Workers of America, 
41 Okl. 621 [139 Pac. 126, L. R. A. 1915D, 789]; J etton-
Dekle-Dumber Co. v. Mather, 53 Fla. 969 [43 So. 590] ; Clem-
mitt v. Watson, 14 Ind. App. 38 [42 N. E. 367]; Gray v. 
Building Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171 [97 N. W. 663, 103 
Am. St. Rep. 477, 1 Ann. Cas. 172, 63 L. R.A. 753] ; State 
v. Employers of Labor, 102 Neb. 768 [169 N. W. 717, 170 
N. W. 185] ; see Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. K 88 [60 Sup. 
Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093] ; Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 
106 [60 Sup. Ct. 746, 84 L. Ed. 1104]; Rest., Torts, secs. 
797 to 812.) In numerous other situations justification exists 
(see Rest., Torts, secs. 766 to 774) depending upon the im-
portance of the interest protected. The presence or absence 
of ill-will, sometimes referred to as "malice", is immaterial, 
except as it indicates whether or not an . interest is actually 
being protected. (Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578 [33 Pac. 492, 
2i L. R. A.233] ; Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council, 
supra j see cases cited in 84 A. L. R. 50; see Rest., Torts, 
sec. 766, comment M.) 
[2] It is well established, however, that a person is not 
justified in inducing a breach of contract simply because he 
il) in competition with one of the parties to the contract and 
seeks to further his own economic advantage at the expense 
of the other. (See cases cited in 84 A. L. R. 83; 24 Cal. 
L. Rev. 208, 211; see Rest., Torts, sec. 768 (2).) Whatever 
interest society has in encouraging free and open competition 
by means not in themselves unlawful, contractual stability is 
generally accepted as of greater importance than competitive 
freedom. Competitive freedom, however, is of sufficient im-
portance to justify one competitor in inducing a third party 
to forsake another competitor if no contractual relationship 
exists between the latter two. (Katz v. Kapper, 7 Cal. App. 
(2d) 1 [44 Pac. (2d) 1060] ; Union Labor Hospital Assn. v. 
"Vance Redwood Lbr. Co., 158 Cal. 551 [112 Pac. 886, 33 
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1034] ; D~bnam v. Simonson, 124 Md. 354 [92 
Atl. 782] ; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555; Rest., Torts, sec. 
768 (1).) A person is likewise free to carryon his business, 
including reduction 'of prices, advertising, and solicitation in 
the usual lawful manner although some third party may be in-
duced thereby to breach his contract with a competitor in favor 
April, 1941.] IMPERIAL ICE CO. V. ROSSIER. 
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of dealing with the advertiser. (Philadelphia Dairy Products 
v. Quaker City Ice Cream Co., 306 Pa. i64 [159 Atl. 3, 84 
A. L. R. 466J ; Citizens' Light etc. 'Co. v. Montgomery Light 
etc. Co., 171 Fed. 553; Passaic Print Works v. Ely &- Walker 
Dry Goods Co., 105 Fed. 163 [44 C. C. A. 426, 62 L. R. A. 
673].) Again, if two parties have separate contracts with a 
third, each may resort to any legitimate means at his dis-
posal to secure performance of his contract even though the 
necessary result' will be to cause a breach of the other con-
tract. (Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt, 120 Md. 
381 [87 Atl. 927, Ann. Cas. 1915A', 702] ; affirmed 237 U. S. 
447 [35 Sup. Ct. 636, 59 L. Ed. 1042]; Knapp v. Penfield, 
143 Misc. 132 [256 N. Y. Supp. 4~] ; National Life &- Acc,~, 
Ins. Co. v. Wallace, 162 Okl. 174 [21 Pac. (2d) 492]; Diver 
v. 1I1iller, 4 W. W. Harr~ [34 Del.] 207, 208 [148 Atl. 291] ; 
Tidal Western Oil Co. v. Shackelford, (Tex. Civ. App.) 297 
S. W. 279; 84 A. L. R. 63; Rest., Torts, sec. 773.).A party 
may not, however, under the guise of competition actively 
and affirmatively induce the breach of a competitor '8 con-
tract in order to secure an economic advantage over that 
competitor. The act of inducing the breach m.ust be an in-
tentional one. If the actor had no knowledge of the exist-
ence of the contract or his actions were not intended to induce 
a breach, he cannot be held liable though an actual breach 
results from his lawful and proper acts. (Rest., Torts, 
sec. 766, comment e; Hornstein v. Podwitz, 254 N. Y. 443 
[173 N. E. 674] ; Sorenson v. Chev1'olet Motor 00., 171 Minn. 
260 [214 N. W. 754] ; Kerr v. Du Pree, 35 Ga. App. 122 [132 
S. E. 393] ; New York Trust Co. v. Island Oil &- Transport 
Corp., 34 Fed. (2d) 649; Wissmath Packing Co. v. Missis-
sippi River Power Co., 179 Iowa 1309 [162 N. W. 846] ; see 
Robins Dry Dock &- Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U. S. 303 [48 
Sup. Ct. 134, 72 L. Ed. 290]; see additional cases cited in 
84 A. L. R. 49.) 
[3] In California the case of Boyson v. Thorn, supra, has 
been considered by many as establishing the proposition that 
no action will lie in this state for inducing breach of con-
tract by means which are not otherwise unlawful. In that 
case the manager of a hotel induced the owner of the 
hotel to evict plaintiffs in violation of a contract. The com-
plaint expressly alleged the existence of malicious motives 
on the part of the manager. This court affirmed a judg-
38 IMPERIAL ICE CO. V. RoSSIER. [18 C. (2d) 
ment entered on, an order which sustained a demurrer with-
out leave to amend, stating that an act otherwise lawful 
was not rendered unlawful by the existence of "mal-
ice". It is clear that the confidential r<;}lationship that 
existed between the manager of the hotel and the owner 
justified the manager in advising the 'owner to violate his 
contract with plaintiffs. His conduct thus being justified, 
it was' lawful despite the existence of ill-will or malice on 
his part. The statements to the effect that no interference 
with contractual relations is actionable if the means em-
ployed are otherwise lawful were not necessary to the deci-
sion and should be disregarded. This interpretation is sub-
stantiated by the construction placed upon Boyson v. Thorn 
in the case of Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Coundl, 
supra, wherein it is stated: "In the first named case [Boyson 
v. Thorn] it was concluded upon an extensive review of the 
authorities, American and English, that 'an act which does 
not amount to a legal injury cannot be actionable becallse it 
is done with bad intent" '. In Oalifornia Grape Oontrol 
Board v. California Produce Corp., 4 Cal. App. (2d) 242 [40 
Pac. (2d) 846], the District Court of Appeal held that an 
unjustifiable interference with contractual relations was ac-
tionable and issued an injunction restraining continued inter-
ference, which is a proper remedy in cases of this type" (see 
cases cited in 84 A. L. R. 85), despite defendant's reliance 
on Boyson v. Thorn. (Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 7,- 1st 
Div., 2d Dist., Civ. No. 9615.) This case marks an outright 
adoption of the majority view. The case of Katz v. Kapper, 
supra, relied upon by defendants, held only that a person by 
the use of lawful means could, interfere with advantageous 
business relationships of a competitor by inducing customers 
to trade with him instead. The case did not involve a breach 
of contract, and the court specifically stated: "In deciding 
whether the conduct of defendants, alleged in the complaint, 
is actionable, it is necessary to apply certain well-settled rules 
relating to competition in business. These may be generally 
stated as follows: 'Competition in business, though carried 
to the extent of ruining a rival, is not ordinarily actionable, 
but every trader is left to conduct his business in his own 
way, so long as the methods he employs do not involve wrong-
ful conduct such as fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation, 
coercion, obstruction, or molestation of the rival ()£ his ser-
April, 1941.] IMPERIAL ICE Co. V. ROSSIER. 
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vants or workmen, or the procurement of the violation of 
contractual .relations ... '." (Italics added.) In Califor-
nia, therefore, an action will lie for unjustifiably inducing a 
breach of contract. 
[4] The complaint in ,the present case alleges that defend-
ants actively induced Coker to violate his contract withplaill-
tiffs so that they might sell ice to him. The contract gave to 
plaintiff the right to sell ice ill the stated territory free from 
the competition of Coker. The defendants, by virtue of their 
interest in the sale of ice in that territory, were in effect com-
peting with plaintiff. By inducing Coker to violate his con-
tract, as alleged in the complaint, they sought to further their 
Own economic advantage at plaintiff's expense. Such con-
duct is not justified. 'Had defendants merely sold ice to--
Coker without actively inducing him to violate his contract, 
his distribution of the ice in the forbidden territory in vio-
lation qf his contract would not then have rendered defend-
ants liable. They may carryon their business of selling, ice 
as usual without incurring liability for breaches of contract 
by their customers. It is necessary to prove that they in-
tentionally and actively induced the breach. Since the ,com-
plaint alleges that they did so and asks for an injunction on 
the grounds that damages would be inadequate, it states a 
cause of action, and the demurrer should therefore have been 
overruled. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Edmonds, J., Shenk, J., and Gibson, C. J., concurred. 
Curtis, J., concurred in the judgment. 
